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ARTICLES
A ROSE IS A ROSE IS...: THE THORNY CASE OF MORRIS
COMMUNICATIONS CORP. V. PROFESSIONAL GOLF
ASSOCIATION TOUR, INC.
Shubha Ghosht
When is an antitrust case not just an antitrust case? In Morris
Communications Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc.,1 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit emphasized: "[T]his .case is not about
copyright law, the Constitution, the First Amendment, or freedom of
the press in news reporting. This case is a straightforward antitrust
case ....
,,2By stressing this point, the court ignored important policy
issues at the intersection of intellectual property and competition
policy. As a result, the Morris decision creates troubling precedent for
antitrust and intellectual property law and puts U.S. law at odds with
developments in the European Union.
I.
THE HOT FACTS

3

The Morris case deals with information, specifically real time
golf scores in tournaments sponsored and organized by the Professional Golf Association (PGA), a private organization in the United
States. Since golf is played over a vast course, the collection and
reporting of real time scores poses a challenge, aggravated by the fact
that the PGA rules prohibit cell phones and other electronic forms of
communication during game play. To resolve this dilemma, the PGA
created, in the early 1980's, the Real-Time Scoring System (RTSS),
which consists of a group of volunteer workers that follow the players
during the game, writing down the scores at the end of each green and
then relaying the scores via hand-held wireless radios. Because of the
large number of players in a tournament, the scores are trickled out to
the public through posted scoreboards around the greens and eventually on the Internet at the PGA website.
f Professor of Law University at Buffalo Law School, B.A., Amherst College, 1984
Ph.D., University of Michigan, 1988, J.D., Stanford Law School, 1994.
364 F.3d 1288, 1292-93 (11 th Cir. 2004).
2 Id.
3 The facts are summarized from the district court opinion, Morris Communications
Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d. 1269 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
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News gathering organizations, both traditional and web-based,
like to report the scores as soon as possible, especially when a local
hero may be playing in the tournament. The PGA controls the access
of news organizations and the dissemination of the scores by permitting
only credentialed news organizations to have access to the collected
scores. Prior to 1999, any credentialed news organization could view
the scores as they were gathered through the RTSS and retransmit them
directly through their Internet servers. In 1999, the PGA entered into
an exclusive arrangement with USA Today for the retransmission of
the scores. Other news organizations were subject to the Online
Service Regulations (OLSR), enacted in 1999, which stated that scoring information could appear on a non-PGA related website either no
sooner than 30 minutes after the actual occurrence of the shots or when
the information became legally available as public information. In
2000, the OLSR were amended to include a prohibition against any
distribution or transfer of scoring information to any party other than a
credentialed news organization without the written consent of the PGA.
Morris Communications Corporation (hereinafter, Morris), a
corporation from the State of Georgia, publishes several traditional and
Internet based newspapers. Prior to 1999, Morris gathered golf scores
from RTSS and disseminated them to many local newspapers that
sought to report on local heroes playing in PGA tournaments. In 2000,
Morris was reprimanded by the PGA for planning to sell golf scores to
the Denver Post in violation of the OLSR. The PGA consented to
Morris' sales on the condition that it obtained the information from the
PGA web site rather than through RTSS. Because of the delays in
posting scores to the PGA web site, Morris requested that it have access
to RTSS information for sale to third parties. The PGA refused stating
that Morris could have access to the RTSS only for use by Morris
publications under the timing and sale restrictions of the OLSR. Morris
subsequently sued the PGA for antitrust violations, claiming that the
PGA's refusal to deal constituted a monopolization of the market for
real-time golf scores.
II.
THE COLD DISPOSITION

Morris claimed that the PGA's OLSR constituted monopolization of the market for real-time golf scores under Section Two of the
Sherman Act. 4 A monopolization claim is established by
4 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
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showing that the defendant has monopoly power in the relevant market
and engaged in "the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." 5 Since the
PGA had exclusive access to the real-time scores, establishing market
power was not an issue. The question was identifying the bad acts
which constituted "willful acquisition or maintenance" by the PGA of
its market power.
Morris argued that the PGA had engaged in two bad acts. The
first was intent to monopolize based on Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp.,6 a famous U.S. Supreme Court case holding
that a monopolist had a duty to cooperate with competitors in certain
situations. 7 The second was control of an essential facility based on a
number of appellate decisions holding that a monopolist cannot deny a
competitor access to a facility that was essential to competition. 8 As a
defense to a Section Two claim, the PGA could present a valid business
justification for its acts. The district court found a valid justification in
the PGA's interest in recouping its investment in creating the RTSS
system for collection and disseminating real time golf scores. Allowing companies like Morris to "free-ride" off these efforts by posting
and selling the golf scores undercut the PGA's investment, the district
court reasoned. Therefore, the PGA had a valid business justification
in adopting and enforcing the OLSR and was not in violation of Section
Two of the Sherman Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision.
III.
COLORING A CARTE BLANCHE

The business justification accepted by the Eleventh Circuit is
reminiscent of arguments justifying intellectual property. The court
reasoned that the RTSS required extensive investment of resources by
the PGA to create, and in order to recoup its investment, the PGA had
to limit access by preventing free-riding of the real-time golf scores.
The high fixed cost, low imitation cost argument that the court enunci5 United States v. GrinnellCorp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
6 472

U.S. 585 (1985).

7 Id.
8 Although the Supreme Court has not adopted the essential facilities doctrine, several

lower federal courts have appealed to the doctrine. For a discussion, see Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (describing the
doctrine but neither endorsing nor repudiating it).

4

BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 3:1

ated is often the justification for copyright and patent restrictions on
imitation and other uses. The problem, however, is that while the
RTSS is arguably protectable under patent law, as a process patent,
Morris was not copying the mechanism of collecting data, but the data
itself. Data, however, are unprotected under copyright and patent law. 9
The troubling result of the Morris decision is that the PGA is able to
create a business model to protect something that is in the public
domain under intellectual property law.
Usually, the conflict between antitrust and intellectual property
entails the intellectual property owner asserting his patents and copyrights as a shield to antitrust. For example, in both the Kodak 0 and
Xerox'I cases, the photocopier company claimed that they could deny
access to their machines to independent service providers of photocopying machines in order to protect the patented and copyrighted technologies. Within the United States, the circuits are split on the use of
intellectual property as a shield, with the Ninth Circuit not accepting
intellectual property as a defense in the Kodak cases, and the Federal
Circuit coming very close to creating an antitrust immunity based on
intellectual property in the Xerox case. In Morris, by contrast, the PGA
does not have a patent or copyright in its product or service, but obtains
quasi-intellectual property protection under the court's application of
antitrust law. Instead of intellectual property law limiting antitrust,
antitrust law is being used to expand the scope of intellectual property
law. There are two reasons why we should be suspicious of this move:
(1) the expansion conflicts with the Supreme Court's case law on the
relationship between antitrust and other federal statutes and (2) the
expansion puts U.S. law in conflict with European law. I address each
of these and present a simple solution to resolve the dilemma posed by
the Morris decision.
A. ExpandingIntellectualProperty through Antitrust Law
First, the use of antitrust law to expand intellectual property is
9 See Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)
(holding that copyright protection in a database does not extend to data); Diamond v.
Chakrabarty,447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that a patent can be obtained for anything under

the sun that is manmade except for laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas).
10 See Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990).
1 See In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation, 203 F.3d 1322
(Fed.Cir. 2000).
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contrary to the analysis of Verizon Communications v. Trinko,12 a case
that deals with the relationship between antitrust law and another
federal statutory scheme, the Telecommunications Act of 1996.13 The
Trinko decision was relied upon heavily by the Eleventh Circuit in
Morris. In Trinko, the Court rejected an antitrust claim brought by a
local telephone carrier against Verizon for failure to comply with the
interconnection rules of the Telecommunications Act. The plaintiff
had argued that Verizon's failure to allow interconnection was an
illegal act of monopolization. The Court failed to find a claim, stating
that "[t]he Sherman Act.. .does not give judges carte blanche to insist
that a monopolist alter its way of doing business whenever some other
' 14
approach might yield greater competition."
What this statement means has been a source of controversy
among commentators. 15 On its face, the Court seems to be saying that
the Sherman Act requires judges to defer to monopolists to further the
goals of competition, an interpretation at odds with the pro-competition
purpose of the Act. A more limited reading of Trinko, one consistent
with the antitrust laws, would deny judges carte blanche to second
guess Congress' decision on how to structure certain industries, such
as telecommunications, as monopolies. The problem is that the Eleventh Circuit does second guess Congress' judgments on the scope of
the monopoly protection granted under intellectual property laws. By
allowing the PGA to protect real-time scores using a business justification analogous to that used for intellectual property, the Eleventh
Circuit expands the scope of the intellectual property grant to include
what Congress exempted: data.
B. The ConstitutionalDimension
The Eleventh Circuit creates a potential constitutional conflict
by using antitrust law to expand the boundaries of intellectual property.
Congress enacted the antitrust laws pursuant to its commerce clause
powers, which permits Congress, "to regulate Commerce.. .among the
several States."' 16 Copyright and patent laws, on the other hand, were
12 See Verizon, 540 U.S. 398.

13 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 26 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
14 Verizon, 540 U.S. at 415-16.
"5 See, e.g., Simon Genevaz, Against Immunity for Unilateral Refusals to Deal in
Intellectual Property: Why Antitrust Law Should Not Distinguish Between IP and Other

PropertyRights, 19 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 741 (2004).
16 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

6

BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 3:1

enacted pursuant to Congress' power, "[t]o promote Progress in Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."' 7 In its decision in Feist, the Supreme Court held that
facts, such as the real time golf scores at issue in Morris, are not
protected under Congress' power to enact copyright and patent laws
because facts are not "writings" under the Constitution. In Morris,
however, facts are allowed to be protected through the antitrust laws,
which flow from Congress' commerce clause powers. However, in
expanding intellectual property protection through the antitrust laws,
the Eleventh Circuit ignored the implied limitation that the intellectual
property clause places on the commerce clause.
In other words,
Congress cannot enact legislation under its commerce clause powers
that it would be unable to enact under its intellectual property clause
powers.

The academic argument for implied limitations flowing from
the intellectual property clause has been made recently by Professors
Heald and Sherry. 18 As the authors point out, the problem with the
implied limitation argument is that it may prove too much. For example, if the intellectual property clause implies a limitation on the
commerce clause power, then by symmetry the commerce clause
power implies a limitation on the intellectual property clause. But,
copyright and patent law protects writings and inventions that are
created wholly intra-state and never commercialized inter-state. But no
one is suggesting that extending copyright and patent to wholly intrastate writings and inventions is unconstitutional. Similarly, while the
Court has held that trademark legislation cannot be enacted under the
intellectual property clause, because trademarks are not "writings," 1 9
the Lanham Act, which is the current legislation protecting trademarks,
is a perfectly constitutional exercise of the commerce clause power.2 0
The implied limitations, the authors conclude, have to be based on the
policies underlying the specific enumerated power and that inform
legislation enacted under the respective power. They identify four
policies that inform the implied limitation analysis under the intellectual
17 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
18 See Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: the
IntellectualPropertyClause as anAbsolute Constrainton Congress,2000 U. I11.L. Rev. 1119

(2000) [hereinafter Heald & Sherry].
'9 See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
20 See Heald & Sherry, supra note 14, at note 181.
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clause: the Suspect Grant Principle, the Quid Pro Quo Principle, the
Authorship Principle, and the Public Domain Principle.
Each of these four principles is implicated by the Morris
decision. By extending intellectual property-like protection to data
under the antitrust law, the Eleventh Circuit is creating a suspect grant,
one that creates a monopoly in real time golf scores. On this point,
there is a potential circularity since the very point of the Eleventh
Circuit's decision is to conclude that there is no illegal monopoly. The
point, however, is that the court should have addressed the intellectual
property issues more closely in order to avoid a conflict between
intellectual property and competition policies. More saliently, the
Eleventh Circuit's extension of protection to data violates the Quid Pro
Quo and Authorship Principles.
The intellectual property clause
clearly states that the exclusive grant is given in exchange for "progress
to Science and Useful Arts." It is not clear how the public benefits by
protecting the PGA's exclusive rights, especially when denying access
to the media potentially limits the public's access to the information.
Furthermore, the authorship principle rests on the need for intellectual
property to protect creative efforts, as opposed to the sweat of the brow.
In the case of real time golf scores, the PGA is not creating anything
new; it is simply reporting information produced as a by-product of the
tournaments. Finally, the extension of intellectual property rights to
data through antitrust law violates the Public Domain Principle. The
Supreme Court in Feist2' held that facts are relegated to the public
domain for all to use. By making the real time golf scores private, the
Eleventh Circuit is narrowing the scope of the public domain as defined
by the intellectual property clause. For these reasons, the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in Morris creates a constitutional conflict by ignoring the implied limitations on Congress' commerce clause powers from
the intellectual property clause.
Precedent from bankruptcy law illustrates the potential problem
created in Morris. The Supreme Court, in Railway Labor Executives
Ass 'n. v. Gibbons,22 invalidated legislation enacted by Congress under
its commerce clause powers to protect employees of the reorganized
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company. 23 The Court
found that the legislation was in conflict with the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause, which grants Congress the auto21 See Feist, 499 U.S. 340.
22
23

455 U.S. 457 (1982).
Id.
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rity to pass bankruptcy law as long as it is uniform across all the states.
As the Court stated:
We do not understand either appellant or the United
States to argue that Congress may enact bankruptcy
laws pursuant to its power under the Commerce
Clause. Unlike the Commerce Clause, the Bankruptcy
Clause itself contains an affirmative limitation or restriction upon Congress' power: bankruptcy laws must
be uniform throughout the United States. Such uniformity in the applicability of legislation is not re24
quired by the Commerce Clause.
The Court's logic in Gibbons applies with equal force to
Morris. Antitrust law cannot expand intellectual property law. If
antitrust law conflicts with intellectual property law, the application of
antitrust law must give way to the limits of Congress' intellectual
property powers. By allowing the PGA to protect data through an
intellectual property-like justification, the Eleventh Circuit ignored the
implied limits from the intellectual property clause. At the minimum,
the court should have considered these limits in assessing the PGA's
business justification.
C. Rethinking Business Justifications
The Eleventh Circuit relied principally on two cases in assessing and ultimately affirming the PGA's asserted business justification:
Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,25 and Consultants &
Designers,Inc. v. Butler Service Group, Inc. 26 The court relied on each
of these cases to establish the proposition that the prevention of free
riding can be a valid business justification for refusing to deal. However, each of these cases is factually distinguishable from Morris and
involves a very different free riding problem.
At issue in Sylvania was a territorial restraint imposed by a
manufacturer on retailers of a product. The Supreme Court upheld the
restraint and established that vertical territorial restraints were subject
to the rule of reason as opposed to the per se rule that applies to horizon24

Id. at 468.

25

433 U.S. 36 (1977).
720 F.2d 1553 (11 th Cir. 1983).

26
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tal territorial restraints. The Court justified the relaxed standard of
review for vertical restraints that there were valid economic reasons
why retailers should be subjected to territorial restrictions while there
was no economic reason, except as a means of restricting supply and
raising price, for agreements among competitors to restrict sales based
on territory. The primary economic justification was the prevention of
free riding in the provision of services by the retailer to customers. If
retailers of a product were not divided territorially, the Court reasoned,
one retailer would have the incentive to free ride on the service and
advertising efforts of other retailers. Territorial restrictions would
reduce this incentive by making it more difficult for one retailer to steal
customers from another retailer by being able to reduce price by
skimping on service. A manufacturer could use territorial restrictions
to standardize services across all retailers. The Court further reasoned
that these restrictions within brand promoted competition across brands
by allowing manufacturers to establish good will and a customer base
for a given brand.
Given this justification for vertical territorial
restrictions, the Court concluded that it would be economically counterproductive to strike down all vertical territorial restrictions under a
per se rule.
The Eleventh Circuit decision in Butler also centered on the
need to prevent free riding, but in the context of the enforceability of
covenants not to compete. The court upheld restrictions imposed by a
placement agency on its employees from accepting permanent employment from a company with which they were placed as temporary
employees. 27 As in Sylvania, the Court applied a rule of reason
analysis to the restriction on the grounds that there was a valid business
justification for the restriction in preventing free riding.2 8 Since the
placement agency invested in identifying the employee's skills and
matching the employee with the employer, the restriction, according to
the Court, allowed the placement agency to recoup its investment in the
recruitment of the employee by preventing the employer from free
riding on the agency's efforts.
Although there is a superficial similarity between the free riding
at issue in Morris and the free riding justifications in Sylvania and
Butler, there are two critical distinctions that required different treatment of the business justification in Morris. First, the facts of both
Sylvania andButler dealt with free riding on a service. Absent the restri27
28

Id.

Id. at 1561.
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ctions, neither defendant would have had the incentive to provide
services that were critical for the development of the relevant market.
In Sylvania, the loss of service would weaken inter-brand competition;
in Butler, the loss of service would vitiate the value-added provided by
the placement agency. By contrast, in Morris, it is not clear that
allowing access to data would have negated the provision of the service
by the PGA in establishing the RTSS. Admittedly, the system may
have become less profitable, but it is far from clear that the value-added
from the service would have vanished as it almost certainly would have
in Butler. The key difference is that the restriction in Morris may have
prevented free riding of a sort but it also would have denied access to
data. Neither the restriction in Sylvania nor that in Butler had a dual
effect.
More critically, neither Sylvania nor Butler touched upon intellectual property. While an argument could be made that the restriction
in Sylvania was indirectly connected to the development of a trademark
through its effect on the promotion of a brand, the key concern for the
Court was customer service and advertising. In Butler, there was no
intellectual property at issue, and the sole issue was the agency's
investment in a certain type of effort. Therefore, neither case implicated intellectual property in the same way as Morris, in which the
central issue was the extent to which antitrust law could be used to
expand intellectual property. As a result, the reliance by the Eleventh
Circuit on the Sylvania and Butler cases was inappropriate. Instead, the
court should have more carefully considered the business justification
in light of the intellectual property policies at stake.
D. Comparisonwith the European Union
The Eleventh Circuit's expansion of intellectual property to
protect data contrasts with the treatment in the European Union, particularly in the Magil129 and IMS30 cases. This pair of cases demonstrates
an alternative tack to reconciling the tensions between intellectual
property and competition policy. The two cases are particularly relevant to an understanding of the Morris case because of their relevance
to rights over data.
29

Radio Telefis Eireannand indep. Television Publ'ns Ltd. (Intellectual Property Owners

Inc. intervening) v. The Comm'n of the European Cmtys. (Magill Television Guide Ltd.
intervening), [1995] All E.R. (EC) 416, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 718 [hereinafterMagill].
30 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, [2004] E.C.D.R. 23
ECJ (5th Chamber).
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In Magill, the data at issue was television broadcast schedules
and their distribution by television stations to the local newspapers and
other media. The distribution of scheduling information was subject to
an embargo on the timing and use of the data, much like the contractual
restrictions on the real-time golf scores under the OLSR. Magill
obtained and published the data in violation of the embargo and was
threatened with a suit for copyright infringement. His subsequent
challenge to the embargo of the European Commission as a violation
of European competition law led to the imposition of a compulsory
license for the use of the scheduling information. 31 The license was
upheld by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which found the
32
television stations had a de facto monopoly over the information itself
and held that the stations' failure to license the information was an
33
abuse of dominant position.
The ECJ's 2004 decision in the IMS case strengthens the rights
of access to information secured by the Magill decision. In IMS, the
ECJ held that the use of a brick structure to organize and present
pharmaceutical data by two distributors of pharmaceutical data was
"indispensable" and that failure to license the data structure was an
abuse of dominant position. The ECJ added that the indispensability
of a data structure could be shown by reference to the costs and efforts
34
needed to create an alternative structure.
The ECJ's decisions in Magill and IMS contrast with the decision in Morris on the identical issue of the treatment of information as
a product. While the ECJ decisions limit the ability of a monopolist to
control access to indispensable data, the Morris decision allows such
monopoly control in order for a company to recoup fixed costs and
prevent free riding. The ECJ decisions do not ignore the fixed costs
issue, but allow for their recoupment through the use of compulsory
licensing. Under United States law, by contrast, compulsory licensing
is extra-ordinary, imposed by courts as a remedial measure in unusual
circumstances or if mandated expressly by Congress. As a result,
courts like the Eleventh Circuit that are confronted with disputes over
monopoly control over data are left with two options: either to find a
violation of the antitrust law and permit access or to take the tack in the
31 Magill, [1995] All E.R. (EC) 416, 4 C.M.L.R. 718.
32

Id., [1995] All E.R. (EC) 416,4 C.M.L.R. 718, at Decision-1,

47.

33 Id. at Decision-], 57.
34 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, [2004] E.C.D.R. 23

ECJ (5th Chamber).
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Morris decision itself and find no violation. The middle ground of
compulsory licensing is unavailable in the United States, except in
extraordinary cases or in the event Congress creates a special remedy.
Nonetheless, the ECJ cases provide some guidance for how to
analyze cases like Morris. The source of the problem in Morris is the
deference the court gives to the business justification offered by the
monopolist. Specifically, the court allows the monopolist to use
intellectual property rationale to expand the scope of copyright and
patent law beyond what Congress and the Constitution allows. To
avoid this conflict, the court should have carefully scrutinized the
business justification presented by the defendant. Inthe IMS case, for
example, the ECJ requires scrutiny of the indispensability of the information structure through consideration of the costs of creating alternatives to the structure. In Morris, by analogy, the court should have
required the defendant to demonstrate a closer connection between the
business justification offered and the actual business plan used. Under
my proposal, if the business plan that the PGA used allowed it to
recoup more than its fixed costs, or to earn what economists call
extra-normal rents through its limitations on access to data, then the
court would show less deference to the business justification. Short of
Congress acting decisively to limit the misuses of antitrust law in cases
like Morris, my proposal will work to properly balance intellectual
property and competition policy within the current framework for
antitrust analysis in the United States.
IV.
Conclusion
Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit's assessment, the dispute in
Morris is not just "a straightforward antitrust case. '35 By reducing the
case to a simple matter of antitrust law, the court upsets the balance
between intellectual property and competition policy in favor of the
former. More troublesome is the expansion of intellectual property
rights beyond the scope of copyright and patent through the court's
application of the business justification doctrine. Less deference to the
business justification of a monopolist, particularly one of data, would
help to avoid the nettlesome problem created by the Eleventh Circuit.
Sometimes an antitrust case is not just an antitrust case, especially
when intellectual property is involved.
35Morris, 364 F.3d at 1293.

